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Abstract
We investigate implementations of biometric cryptosystems pro-
tecting fingerprint templates (which are mostly based on the fuzzy
vault scheme by Juels and Sudan in 2002) with respect to the security
they provide. We show that attacks taking advantage of the system’s
false acceptance rate, i.e. false-accept attacks, pose a very serious risk
— even if brute-force attacks are impractical to perform. Our obser-
vations lead to the clear conclusion that currently a single fingerprint
is not sufficient to provide a secure biometric cryptosystem. But there
remain other problems that can not be resolved by merely switching
to multi-finger: Kholmatov and Yanikoglu in 2007 demonstrated that
it is possible to break two matching vault records at quite a high rate
via the correlation attack.
We propose an implementation of a minutiae fuzzy vault that is
inherently resistant against cross-matching and the correlation attack.
Surprisingly, achieving cross-matching resistance is not at the cost of
authentication performance. In particular, we propose to use a ran-
domized decoding procedure and find that it is possible to achieve a
GAR = 91% at which no false accepts are observed on a database
generally used. Our ideas can be adopted into an implementation of a
multibiometric cryptosystem. All experiments described in this paper
can fully be reproduced using software available for download.1
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1 Introduction
In a traditional password-based authentication scheme, user names along
with their respective passwords are stored on a server-side database. In
such a scenario, we usually cannot prevent the fact that some persons will
have access to the content of the database. Such persons (for example,
system administrators) are thus able to read the password information re-
lated to enrolled users. To prevent them from using password information
to impersonate authorized users, a non-invertible transformation2 (e.g., a
one-way hash function) of each password is stored rather than the unpro-
tected password. During authentication, the user sends his password to the
service provider, which computes the password’s non-invertible transforma-
tion. Next, the service provider compares the transformation that is stored
in the database with the just-transformed password. If both agree, the au-
thentication attempt is accepted; otherwise it is rejected. So a would-be
thief cannot find the passwords in the database; he must either steal them
from users or guess them.
However, a password can be forgotten or, if written down, can be stolen.
To prevent these risks, many individuals attempt to create easily memorable
passwords. Unfortunately, this often results in the individual choosing a
weak password, typically constructed using personal information (e.g., a
birthday or the name of a significant other), which increases the risk of
others’ guessing the password — and therefore, of theft.
A popular alternative to password is to base authentication on biometrics
such as fingerprints. Authentication protocols that incorporate biometric
templates do not have the disadvantage that they can be forgotten or lost:
Barring injuries, fingers are always with us; moreover, fingerprint features
remain reasonably invariant over time.
If a biometric authentication scheme is in place the incorporated tem-
plates have especially to be stored protected. The situation is rather serious,
because biometric templates may correspond to human beings with nearly
unique precision compared to mere passwords. In addition, ineffective pro-
tection of biometric templates has consequences beyond breach of privacy, as
compared to protecting passwords: For example, if a password is corrupted
(e.g., discovered by others) it can be replaced easily compared to replacing
a biometric template.
While the requirements for so-called biometric template protection schemes
are similar to those used for protecting passwords, they are more difficult
to achieve: With high confidence it must be efficiently verifiable whether
a provided biometric template matches the template that is encrypted by
the stored data; furthermore, it must be computationally infeasible to de-
2Non-invertible transformation of a password means that it is easy to transform the
password, while on the contrary the derivation of a password from a given transformation
is computationally hard.
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rive the unencrypted biometric template from the stored data. There is one
great difference between password and biometric authentication schemes:
Contrary to passwords different measurements of the same biometric source
will differ, while also having some reasonable similarity. These differences
between two biometric templates of the same individual can be usefully con-
ceptualized as deviations or errors. In this vein, there have been proposals
for biometric template protections schemes that couple techniques from tra-
ditional cryptography with techniques from the discipline of error-correcting
codes.
1.1 The Fuzzy Vault Scheme
In 2002, Juels and Sudan proposed the fuzzy vault scheme [1] which is a
construction for protecting noisy data. While the fuzzy commitment scheme
[2], which was proposed by Juels and Wattenberg in 1999, requires the data
to be presented as a fixed-length feature vector, the fuzzy vault scheme
allows the length of the data to vary and the data to be unordered. These
properties enable the fuzzy vault scheme to protect fingerprint templates
such as fingerprint minutiae. It works as follows.
Enrollment
Given a fingerprint template containing t fingerprint features, e.g., minutiae,
its elements are encoded as elements x in a fixed finite field F. One chooses
a secret message polynomial f ∈ F[X] in the indeterminate X of degree
smaller than k and evaluates f(x) at the encoded element x. The genuine
pairs (x, f(x)) are dispersed among a large set of chaff points that do not
lie on the graph of f , such that a vault of size n is built.
Authentication
Using a second genuine template one aims at distinguishing the genuine
points from the chaff points. Given the points are mainly genuine, one can
tolerate errors within certain limits determined by error-correcting codes
[3–6].
Security
From the difficulty of the problem of distinguishing genuine from chaff (with-
out the help of a second genuine template) the fuzzy vault scheme draws its
security. This problem can be reduced from the polynomial reconstruction
problem which is believed to be hard in general if t√(k − 1) · n [7–11].
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1.2 The Fuzzy Fingerprint Vault
There are several biometric traits which can be used in biometric authen-
tication systems (see [12] for an overview). Every biometric discipline is
associated with very individual challenges which have to be solved before
incorporating them into a biometric template protection scheme. One bio-
metric trait that can be extracted from humans are his fingerprints [13].
This papers focuses on fingerprints and examines their adequacy of being
protected by the fuzzy vault scheme. Even though there are other biometric
template protection schemes [14] and implementations for fingerprints [15]
the fuzzy vault scheme is the most dominant and promising scheme for which
implementations to protect fingerprints have been proposed.
Implementations
Several fuzzy vault variants for protecting fingerprint minutiae templates
can be found in the literature [16–23].
To increase vault practicability as well as security, Nagar et al. (2008,
2010) [22, 23] proposed to fuse a fingerprint’s minutiae template with in-
formation about its ridge orientation and frequency by means of minutiae
descriptors [24]. In distinguishing genuine from chaff minutiae an attacker
has in addition to guess the respective minutiae descriptors. This adds some
security to the base vault implementation.
All the implementations above require an alignment step where the query
minutiae templates are aligned to the vault. This is very challenging since
the enrolled templates are protected. Currently, the alignment is realized
by techniques using auxiliary alignment data, e.g., see [19, 20]. The use of
auxiliary alignment data, however, may cause security issues resulting in the
leakage of information from the protected fingers.
Another interesting approach is to use alignment-free features, i.e. fea-
tures that do not dependent of the finger’s rotation or displacement. Li et
al. (2010) [25] proposed to fuse minutiae local structures [26] with minutiae
descriptors [24] and to protect them by the fuzzy vault scheme. The recog-
nition performance that the authors report is promising and the error-prone
step of aligning the query fingerprint to the vault is circumvented. Further-
more, the problem of information leakage by auxiliary alignment data does
not exist anymore.
1.3 Content and Contribution of the Paper
After we described the functioning of a minutiae fuzzy vault in more detail
(Section 2) we investigate the security of implementations from the literature
in different attack scenarios (Section 3). Reproducing the work of Miha˘ilescu
et al. (2009) [27] we show that brute-force attacks can be very practical to
perform against most implementations (see Section 3.1).
4
But even if brute-force attacks are infeasible to perform, there remains
the possibility of the attacker to run an attack that takes it advantage out of
the system’s false acceptance rate, i.e. false-accept attack ; also see Section
26.6.1.1 in [28]. We show that false-accept attacks are even much easier to
perform than brute-force attacks (see Section 3.3). Note that the false-accept
attack is not restricted to the fuzzy vault scheme but it can be applied with
virtually no modifications to every authentication scheme. Its attack success
rate only depends on the system’s false acceptance rate and the average time
needed to run an impostor recognition attempt. Therefore, our observations
clearly advocate that biometric cryptosystems merely based on a single fin-
ger cannot provide effective security. Rather multi-finger cryptosystems [29]
(or even multibiometric cryptosystems [30]) should be developed.
For the fuzzy vault scheme there remains a problem that can not be
solved merely by switching to multibiometrics. Given two matching in-
stances of a minutiae fuzzy vault to an adversary he can correlate them;
genuine minutiae tend to agree well in comparison to chaff minutiae, which
are likely to be in disagreement. Thus, an intruder may reliably deter-
mine whether two vault records match, i.e. cross-matching. Even worse,
via correlation the adversary can try to distinguish genuine minutiae from
chaff minutiae. If in this way a set of vault minutiae can be extracted that
contains a reasonable proportion of genuine minutiae, then the vault can
efficiently be broken. Consequently, this attack is called correlation attack.
Scheirer and Boult (2007) were the first who have drawn the attention to the
risk of attacking fuzzy vault via record multiplicity [31]. Then Kholmatov
and Yanikoglu (2008) have demonstrated the practicability of the correla-
tion attack [32]. Therefore, in Section 4, we propose an implementation of
a minutiae fuzzy vault that is inherently resistant against cross-matching
and the correlation attack. Fortunately, cross-matching resistance can be
achieved without decreasing the verification performance as we found in a
test on a fingerprint database publicly available (see Section 4.4). This is
mainly due to a randomized decoding procedure that we propose.
A final discussion, conclusion, and an outlook are given in Section 5.
All experiments described in this paper can fully be reproduced using
software that we made available for download.1
2 Minutiae Fuzzy Vault Implementation
Assume tha we are given a minutiae template {(a, b, θ)} where (a, b) and θ
denote its position and angle, respectively. Using the fuzzy vault scheme we
may protect the template as follows.
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2.1 Enrollment
We describe the vault construction analogous to Nandakumar et al. (2007)
[20] with some minor modifications.
As in [20], only well-separated minutiae are selected. Furthermore, only
the t ≤ tmax minutiae of best quality that are well-separated are selected
for vault construction. If it is not possible to select at least a certain num-
ber of tmin minutiae, the enrollment is aborted and a failure to capture is
reported. Otherwise, the construction continues as follows. To hide the
selected genuine minutiae Tgen, a set of chaff minutiae Tchaff is generated
at random fulfilling the following side conditions: First, each chaff minutia
has the property that it is well-separated from all other vault minutiae —
genuine and chaff; second, a chaff minutia’s position lays within the corre-
sponding fingerprint image’s region; third, the number of chaff minutiae is
such that the vault minutiae reach a predefined size n ≥ t, i.e. n − t chaff
minutiae are generated. The union of genuine and chaff minutiae is referred
to as the vault minutiae Tvault = Tgen ∪ Tchaff .
After the vault minutiae have been established, a secret is encoded as a
polynomial f of degree < k having coefficients in a fixed finite field F = Fq of
size q ≥ n. Now, list the vault minutiae as (a0, b0, θ0), . . . , (an−1, bn−1, θn−1)
by some convention, e.g., by sorting them in lexicographical order. By
x0, . . . , xn−1 ∈ F denote n distinct elements of the finite field. In this way,
each list index i = 0, . . . , n − 1 uniquely encodes an element in F. Now we
build the genuine set as G = {(xi, f(xi)) | (ai, bi, θi) ∈ Tgen}. Analogously,
the chaff set is defined as C = {(xj , yj) | (aj , bj , θj) ∈ Tchaff} where the yj s
are chosen uniformly at random such that yj 6= f(xj). The union V = G∪C
builds the vault points.
The protected template is published as the triple (V, Tvault, h(f)) where
h(f) denotes a cryptographic hash value of f (e.g., SHA-1) to allow safe
recovery of f at genuine authentication.
Note, that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the vault V and
the vault minutiae Tvault. Thus, given a genuine minutia we also know its
corresponding vault point and vice versa. In this respect, our construction is
different from the construction of Nandakumar et al. (2007) who encode the
minutiae information on the x-coordinate of its corresponding vault point.
Another difference of our construction is that we use a SHA-1 hash value
instead of constituting the secret polynomial with redundancy bits.
2.2 Authentication
On authentication, a query template of the (alleged) genuine user is pro-
vided. As on enrollment, only well-separated minutiae of good quality are
selected (again, at most tmax). For simplicity, we assume that the query
minutiae are correctly aligned to the vault. We extract those vault minu-
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) Genuine (red) and chaff minutiae (gray); (b) each minutia is
encoded on a vault point’s abscissa where its ordinate binds the minutia to
the secret polynomial
tiae that are well approximated by aligned query minutiae. In this way, we
establish the unlocking set U which consists of those vault points that cor-
respond to the just extracted minutiae. Let t be the size of the unlocking set
U. There are
(
t
k
)
combinations of selecting k different unlocking points. For
each combination, the interpolation polynomial f∗ ∈ F[X] is computed and
it is checked whether its hash value agrees with the hash value of the correct
polynomial, i.e. if h(f∗) = h(f). If true then f∗ = f with overwhelming
reliability and f∗ is output as the correct polynomial which corresponds to a
successful authentication. Otherwise, if all h(f∗) 6= h(f) the authentication
attempt is rejected.
2.3 Alignment
There have been proposals to ease aligning the query minutiae to the vault
such that matching vault minutiae agree with their respective query minutiae
(see [17, 19, 20, 33, 34]). All of these proposals leak information about the
corresponding fingerprint, e.g., about some of its minutiae or its orientation
field. Moreover, it is not clear to what extent auxiliary alignment data can
help an adversary to find matching vault correspondences via cross-matching
(see Section 3.5).
Ideally, fingerprints can be pre-aligned such that matching query minu-
tiae already agree with genuine vault minutiae. However, pre-alignment
is currently not very robust. But increasing robustness of fingerprint pre-
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alignment would automatically increase the practicability of a minutiae fuzzy
vault implementation without decreasing its overall security. Therefore, al-
though challenging, it seems to be worth to search for more robust pre-
alignment procedures. Alternatively, suitable alignment-free features can
be used for constructing the vault (see [25]).
Due to open questions related to vault alignment, if we investigate vault
performances, we assume a well-solved alignment framework for genuine
authentication. Consequently, if an authentication of a genuine user is sim-
ulated, the alignment is obtained by aligning the query minutiae template
to the enrolled template in clear. On an impostor authentication, we do not
make any attempts in aligning the query template to the vault.
2.4 Evaluation Database and Protocol
Throughout, we used the FVC 2002 DB2 database3 for our performance
evaluations as it is the common database used to evaluate fingerprint fuzzy
vault implementations.
We strictly follow the FVC protocol [35] even though in the literature the
implementations are evaluated following a protocol in where the number of
observed impostor recognition attempts is artificially increased [18–20,22,23,
25]. But this would not correspond to statistically independent observations.
As already described in Section 2.3, on an genuine authentication at-
tempt we assert that the query finger is correctly aligned by aligning both
fingers in clear; for an impostor recognition attempt, we do not make any
attempts for alignment.
Genuine acceptance rates and false acceptance rates will be denoted by
GAR and FAR, respectively. Furthermore, throughout the literature the
genuine acceptance rate incorporating the first two impression of each fingers
only are reported. This corresponds to the scenario in where the fingerprints
are of good quality which positively affects the genuine acceptance rates.
Therefore, to allow for comparing our genuine acceptance rates with other
implementations, we will also keep track of the genuine acceptance rate
w.r.t. the subset of the database. The corresponding genuine acceptances
rates are indicated by sub-GAR.
The minutiae templates that we used have been obtained using a com-
mercial extractor.4
2.5 Performance Evaluation
We evaluated the vault performances for different k on the FVC 2002 DB2
database following the FVC protocol (see [35]) using parameters adopted
from Nandakumar et al. (2007). They propose to hide at most tmax = 24
3The database consists of 8 impressions each acquired from a total of 100 fingers.
4Verifinger SDK 5.0 [36]
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Table 1: Performance Evaluation of our minutiae fuzzy vault re-
implementation using parameters adopted from Nandakumar et al. (2007)
[20]
polynomial degree genuine false avg. avg.
acceptance acceptance genuine impostor
rate rate decoding decoding
time time
< k GAR (sub-GAR) FAR GDT IDT
= 7 ≈ 86.54% (≈ 96%) ≈ 3.87% ≈ 0.05 sec ≈ 0.08 sec
= 8 ≈ 80.76% (≈ 92%) ≈ 1.63% ≈ 0.121 sec ≈ 0.140 sec
= 9 ≈ 74.61% (≈ 92%) ≈ 0.56% ≈ 0.226 sec ≈ 0.198 sec
= 10 ≈ 67.52% (≈ 92%) ≈ 0.16% ≈ 0.351 sec ≈ 0.240 sec
= 11 ≈ 58.93% (≈ 91%) ≈ 0.10% ≈ 0.5 sec ≈ 0.248 sec
= 12 ≈ 51.07% (≈ 87%) = 0% ≈ 0.546 sec ≈ 0.193 sec
and at least tmin = 18 well-separated
5 genuine minutiae in a vault of size
n = 224.
Example 1. For example, if k = 9 then the genuine acceptance rate was
determined as GAR ≈ 74.61% and the false acceptance rate as FAR ≈
0.56%. The total number of genuine authentication attempts and impostor
authentication attempts was 2749 and 4856, respectively. FTCR ≈ 3.88%
of the enrollments were aborted, because it was not possible to select at least
tmin = 18 well-separated minutiae.
The genuine acceptance rate measured on the finger’s respective first two
impressions was found to be sub-GAR ≈ 92% at a failure to capture rate of
sub-FTCR = 1%.
Note that our rates differ from those reported in [20]. This is due to the
use of a different authentication scheme than [20] as well of the fact that we
decoupled the alignment from the vault.
We will use the re-implementation to demonstrate the effectiveness of
the false-accept attack in Section 3.3. Note, even in the case that we would
use auxiliary automatic alignment data to ease alignment, an attacker does
not have to account for it; our false acceptance rates reflect the success rate
of such a corresponding attack.
5Two minutiae (a, b, θ) and (a′, b′, θ′) are said to be well-separated if ‖(a, b)−(a′, b′)‖2+
0.2 ·max(|θ − θ′|, |360◦ − θ + θ′|) > 25.
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2.6 Fuzzy Vault with Minutiae Descriptors
To improve the practicability as well as the security of the construction
in [20], in addition to mere minutiae, Nagar et al. (2008, 2010) [22, 23]
proposed to incorporate minutiae descriptors in constructing the vault.
A minutia’s descriptors consists of the ridge orientation (relative to the
orientation of the minutia) and ridge frequency of points arranged around
the minutia (see Fig. 2). The authors showed how a minutia descriptor can
be quantized as an m-bit vector w ∈ {0, 1}m. Furthermore, the correspond-
ing vault points (x, y) ∈ F × F ordinate value y is encoded as a codeword
c(y) of a binary error-correcting code of length m which is capable in cor-
recting ν (say) errors. The fuzzy commitment [2] of c(y) using the witness
w is computed next, i.e. c(y) +w.6 Rather publishing the vault point (x, y)
the tuple (x, c(y) + w) is published instead. For chaff points the ordinate
values are protected using random descriptor binarizations from a pool of
chaff descriptors.
Figure 2: Minutiae descriptors — thickness and orientation of yellow lines
correspond to ridge frequency and orientation descriptor, respectively; the
orientation fields and frequency images to visualize were estimated using the
methods in [37] and [38], respectively.
On authentication, the unlocking points (x, c(y) + w) are extracted as
in the basic vault. Using the minutiae descriptor w′ ∈ {0, 1}m of the cor-
responding query minutia, the difference c(y) + w − w′ is computed.7 If
w′ is sufficiently similar to w, i.e. if they differ in at most ν positions, the
difference c(y)+w−w′ can be corrected to c(y) which encodes the correct y.
Therefore, in addition to sufficiently many genuine vault points among the
6Addition is performed bitwise modulo 2 which is equivalent to a bitwise xor operation.
7Note that addition modulo 2 is the same as subtraction modulo 2, i.e. c(y)+w−w′ =
c(y) + w + w′.
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unlocking set it is required that their correct ordinate values can be recov-
ered. This will be the case, if a minutia descriptor with sufficient similarity
to the genuine descriptor can be found. Thus, for the vault to successfully
unlock there is required more agreeing information of the query template to
the enrolled template and thus the basic vault’s security is improved.
Next, we investigate the security of different fingerprint fuzzy vault im-
plementations from the literature.
3 Attacks
3.1 Brute-Force Attack
While attack scenarios involving brute-force attacks are analyzed throughout
the literature they frequently lack of emphasizing how practical these naive
attacks can be. In this section, for parameters adopted from implementa-
tions found in the literature we determine the expected number of computer
time that is expected to be required for a successful brute-force attack.
Therefore, we briefly reproduce the work of Miha˘ilescu et al. (2009) [27]
to emphasize the practicability of brute-force attacks against current imple-
mentations of the fuzzy fingerprint vault; for a smart polynomial reconstruc-
tion approach we refer to Choi et al. (2011) [39]. Afterwards we modify the
attack for the implementation of Nagar et al. (2008, 2010) [22,23].
Assume that an intruder has intercepted a vault of size n in which t
genuine vault points are contained laying on the graph of a common poly-
nomial of degree < k. Furthermore, we assume that a cryptographic hash
value h(f) of the correct polynomial is publicly available to the adversary.
To find the correct polynomial, the intruder 1) may guess k random vault
points, 2) determine its interpolation polynomial f∗, and 3) check whether
h(f∗) = h(f): If true, the attacker has found the correct polynomial with
overwhelming reliability; otherwise, he repeats the attack until a polynomial
f∗ with h(f∗) = h(f) is found.
The probability that a random choice of k vault points yields the correct
polynomial is bf(n, t, k)−1 where
bf(n, t, k) =
(
n
k
)
·
(
t
k
)−1
. (1)
Thus, after
log(0.5)/ log(1− bf(n, t, k)−1) (2)
iterations the adversary can expect to find the correct polynomial.
Example 2. For example, if (n, t, k) = (224, 24, 9) (which are parameters as
proposed by Uludag and Jain 2006 [19]) the adversary can expect to success-
fully break the vault after ≈ 231 iterations using Formula (2). For F = F216
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Table 2: Expected computational timings for running a successful brute-
force attack on a 3.2 Ghz desktop computer with four processor cores against
different vault parameters found in the literature
para- iterations expected
meters (n, t, k) security per second time for
as in per core success
[18] (218, 18, 9) ≈ 236 151, 316.5 < 17 hours
[19] (224, 24, 9) ≈ 231 148, 634.1 < 50 min
[20] (224, 24, 8) ≈ 227 183, 188.8 < 3 min
" (224, 24, 9) ≈ 231 148, 634.1 < 50 min
" (224, 24, 11) ≈ 239 109, 066.9 < 11 days
[34] (440, 40, 13) ≈ 248 82, 056.84 < 18 years
" (440, 40, 14) ≈ 252 69, 227.56 < 325 years
we experimentally determined that it is possible to perform 148, 634.1 it-
erations in one second of the above brute-force attack. Thus, if four pro-
cessors/cores are used by the attacker he can expect to be successful after
≈ 49 min.
We empirically determined expected times for a successful brute-force
attack for parameters from different implementations from the literature.
The results are listed in Table 2. We find that brute-force attacks can
become practical to perform easily — even on a standard desktop computer.
Related work can be found in [27,39].
3.2 Attack against Fuzzy Vault with Minutiae Descriptors
To break instances of the implementation of Nagar et al. (2008,2010) [22,23]
the attacker must act differently in choosing a candidate polynomial f∗
because the vault points ordinate values are protected. Therefore, we assume
that the adversary has access to a large pool of minutiae descriptors.
3.2.1 Decoupling the Vault from Protected Ordinate Values
For each protected vault point (x, c(y) +w) (chaff and genuine) the attacker
iterates through the descriptor pool. For each descriptor w′ ∈ {0, 1}m the
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difference c(y) +w−w′ is computed and then an attempt is made to decode
c(y) + w − w′ to its nearest codeword c(y′). There are three possible cases:
i) The attacker can correct to the right c(y) and thus obtains the correct
ordinate value y;
ii) he obtains another codeword c(y′) 6= c(y) and thus an incorrect ordi-
nate value y′ 6= y;
iii) the difference cannot be corrected to any codeword.
While iterating through the descriptor pool, the attacker establishes a set
of candidate ordinate values. For simplicity, we assume that the correct
ordinate value can be found in the candidate set for each vault point. By
{y′} denote such a candidate set. For the attacker to select a candidate
polynomial, he may randomly choose k distinct vault points and, in addition,
for each vault point a random candidate ordinate value.
To estimate the probability that such a candidate polynomial yields the
correct polynomial, we first estimate the expectation of the size of the can-
didate set for random vault points (x, c(y) + w).
An important tool to achieve this is the sphere packing density of the
underlying binary error-correcting code, which can be defined to be the
probability that a random m-bit word can be corrected to a valid codeword.
Therefore, by ` denote the number of codewords. Then its sphere packing
density is
ρ = 2`−m
ν∑
j=0
(
m
j
)
(3)
where ν denotes the code’s error-correcting capability. We argue with [23]
that the difficulty in guessing a random minutiae descriptor is R ≈ 4.27.
Therefore, we estimate the expectation of the number of of candidate ordi-
nate values for each vault point as S = 1 + (R − 1) · ρ. Thus, we estimate
the brute-force security as
Sk · bf(n, t, k). (4)
3.2.2 Evaluation of the Attack
For the implementation of [23] in where the ordinate values are protected via
a (511, 19)-BCH code, which can correct ν = 119 errors, the corresponding
sphere packing density is ρ ≈ 1.3 · 10−29. Thus, we expect the number of a
vault point’s candidate ordinate values to be S = 1 + (R− 1) · ρ ≈ 1 + 4.25 ·
10−27. Consequently, the estimated brute-force security for vault parameters
(n, t, k) = (224, 24, 9) is Sk · bf(n, t, k) ≈ 2.54 · 109 which corresponds to 31
bits. In comparison, the brute-force security for the base implementation
without protected ordinate values is bf(n, t, k) ≈ 2.54 · 109 which is almost
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the same. Thus, there is virtually no improvement in protecting the vault
points ordinate values if the code’s sphere packing density is too small. As
a countermeasure, the use of two other BCH codes of higher sphere packing
density have been investigated in [23] with a measurable improvement in the
brute-force security. The corresponding evaluations can be found in Table
3.
Table 3: Brute-force securities of the implementation of Nagar et al. (2010)
for different choices of BCH codes and for different polynomial degrees. The
genuine acceptance rates have been extracted from Figure 7 in [23] in where
the false acceptance rates have been indicated as to be very close to 0.
BCH(511, 19) BCH(31, 6) BCH(15, 5)
poly- brute- brute- brute-
nomial force sub- force sub- force sub-
degree security GAR security GAR security GAR
k = 7 ≈ 224 95% ≈ 227 94% ≈ 234 93%
k = 8 ≈ 227 94% ≈ 231 93% ≈ 240 93%
k = 9 ≈ 231 93% ≈ 235 93% ≈ 245 91%
k = 10 ≈ 235 89% ≈ 239 87% ≈ 250 85%
k = 11 ≈ 239 84% ≈ 244 81% ≈ 256 76%
k = 12 ≈ 243 78% ≈ 248 77% ≈ 261 73%
3.3 False-Accept Attack
Brute-force attacks can definitely be improved. For example, one may use
statistics of fingerprints to accelerate brute-force attacks. Assuming that the
statistics of fingerprints is best reproduced by real fingers, making heuristic
considerations one may conclude that an attack that takes advantage out of
the system’s false-acceptance rate FAR yields the system’s overall security.
In any case, such an attack yields an upper bound of the system’s overall
security and is a hint for the existence of a similar efficient statistical attack.
In the scenario of a false-accept attack we assume that an adversary
who has intercepted a vault also has access to a sufficiently large database
containing fingerprint templates.
Then the adversary may try to recover the protected template from the
vault off-line by simulating authentication attempts using the templates in
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the database as the queries. For a random query template, with probabil-
ity FAR the vault will unlock and reveal the protected key and template.
Thus, the adversary can expect to successfully break the vault after he has
simulated log(0.5)/ log(1 − FAR) authentication attempts. If the average
impostor decoding time IDT is known then the computational cost for a
successful false-accept attack can be estimated as
log(0.5)/ log(1− FAR) · IDT . (5)
Example 3. For example, assume that an adversary has intercepted a minu-
tiae fuzzy vault as in Section 2 with k = 9. With Table 1 we may assume
that FAR ≈ 0.56% and IDT ≈ 0.198 sec. Thus, the adversary can expect to
successfully break the vault after only ≈ 24.6 sec. If four processors/cores
are used in parallel the time furthermore reduces to approximately 6.15 sec.
In comparison to the brute-force attack, which takes ≈ 49 min on the same
computer, the false-accept attack turns out to be the better choice for the
adversary and thus poses the more serious risk.
3.3.1 Confidence of the False Acceptance Rate
In the above example we assumed that the false acceptance rate was FAR ≈
0.56%. This is because we observed 27 false accepts among 4, 856 simulated
impostor authentication attempts and thus FAR = 27/4, 856 ≈ 0.56%. But
actually, the observation of a false accept is the result of a random sample.
Assume that we observed s false accepts among N impostor recognition
attempts. Let FAR∗ = s/N be the point estimation for the false acceptance
rate. We can only be absolutely certain that FAR ∈ (0%, 100%) but, roughly
speaking, it is not very likely that the true false acceptance rate differs from
FAR∗ too much. To estimate the confidence of FAR∗, a useful concept is
the one of confidence intervals.
Definition 1 (Confidence Interval). Let FAR be the system’s true (but un-
known) false acceptance rate. For a fixed γ ∈ (0%, 100%] let FAR0 ≤ FAR1
such that FAR∗ ∈ [FAR0,FAR1] for 100γ% of all point estimations FAR∗.
The interval [FAR0,FAR1] is called γ-confidence interval for FAR. γ is
called confidence level8 of the interval [FAR0,FAR1].
There are methods that compute confidence intervals for a given confi-
dence level γ when s false accepts within N impostor recognition attempts
have been observed. These are, for instance, the Clopper-Pearson inter-
vals [40].
Example 4. The 95%-Clopper-Pearson confidence interval for the false ac-
ceptance rate in Example 3 is [0.36%, 0.81%], i.e. if s = 27 false accepts
8A popular choice for a confidence level is γ = 95%.
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Table 4: Performance of the false-accept attack against the implementa-
tion of Section 2 using the parameters of the performance evaluation. The
timings are have been determined on a 3.2Ghz desktop computer with four
processor cores.
length point avg. 95%- expected expected
of estimation impostor confidence time time
secret of the decoding interval for a for a
pol. false time for the successful successful
acceptance false false- brute-
rate acceptance accept force
rate attack attack
k FAR∗ IDT [FAR0,FAR1]
= 7 188/4, 856 0.08 sec [3.33%, 4.45%] 0.31 sec–0.41 sec ≈ 11.4 sec
= 8 79/4, 856 0.140 sec [1.29%, 2.02%] 1.19 sec–1.87 sec ≈ 2.97 min
= 9 27/4, 856 0.198 sec [0.37%, 0.81%] 4.22 sec–9.33 sec ≈ 49.4 min
= 10 8/4, 856 0.240 sec [0.07%, 0.32%] 12.8 sec–58.4 sec ≈ 13.9 hours
= 11 5/4, 856 0.248 sec [0.03%, 0.24%] 17.9 sec–2.14 min ≈ 10.2 days
= 12 0/4, 856 0.193 sec [0.00%, 0.06%] > 54.2 sec ≈ 6.6 months
among N = 4, 856 impostor recognition attempts have been observed. As a
consequence, with a confidence of 95%, the expected time needed to perform
a successful false-accept attack is between ≈ 4.23 sec and ≈ 9.33 sec.
3.3.2 Rule of Three
Assume we observed s = 0 false accepts among N impostor recognition
attempts. Even if a point estimation yields a false acceptance rate of 0%
this estimation is not very confident. The rule of three enables an easy way
to estimate a 95%-confidence interval in this case (see [41,42]).
Theorem 1 (Rule of Three). The interval [0, 3/N ] is a confidence interval
of confidence level at least 95%.
3.3.3 Evaluation
Example 5. Assume an adversary has intercepted a minutiae fuzzy vault
as in Section 2 with k = 12. The rule of three states that (with confidence
95%) we can only expect the true false-acceptance rate to be FAR ≈ 0.06%.
Thus, with an impostor decoding time of IDT ≈ 0.193 sec using Formula (5)
the adversary can expect to successfully break the vault after ≈ 3 min 37 sec.
If four processors/cores are used in parallel he may be successful even after
≈ 54.2 sec.
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For the implementation in Section 2 we estimated the expected compu-
tational time of a successful false-accept attack. The way we estimated the
expected times is analogous to the estimations in Example 4 and Example
5. The results can be found in Table 4.
3.3.4 Evaluation against Alignment-Free Fuzzy Fingerprint Vault
For the alignment-free fuzzy fingerprint vault implementation of Li et al.
(2010) [25] where (n, t, k) = (440, 40, 13) a false-acceptance rate of 0.04%
was reported.9 The authors estimate the false-acceptance rate as a point
estimation by observing N = 34, 650 impostor authentication attempts.10
Therefore, we assume that s = 14 false-accepts were observed in their experi-
ment. The 95%-Clopper-Pearson confidence interval for the false-acceptance
rate thus is [0.0221%, 0.0678%]. Furthermore, the authors report an aver-
age decoding time of 0.192 sec.11 Consequently, using Formula (5) a false-
accept attack may consume between 49 sec and 2.51 min of computer time
if four processors/cores are used. In comparison to the brute-force, which
is expected to require ≈ 20 years (see Table 2), the time for a successful
false-accept attack is negligible. Moreover, the time is far away from being
acceptable for a secure system.
For k = 14 no false-accepts were observed by the authors. The rule
of three (see Section 3.3.2) states that (with a confidence of 95%) the true
false acceptance rate is < 0.0087%. Assuming IDT = 0.192 sec we can
only expect the false-accept attack to require approximately 6.4 min which
strongly contrasts an alleged security of 52 bits.
3.3.5 Evaluation against Fuzzy Vault with Minutiae Descriptors
If a vault was intercepted by an intruder in where the ordinate values are
protected with minutiae descriptors (see Section 2.6) the false-accept at-
tack can be run without modifications. For example, if k = 12 using the
(15, 5)-BCH code, no false accepts have been observed within 9, 900 impos-
tor authentication attempt in [23].10 Thus, with the rule of three we can
only expect the true false acceptance rate to be FAR ≤ 0.03%. By our
experiments (see Table 1) we assume an average impostor decoding time of
IDT = 0.193 sec. Consequently, we can only expect a false-accept to last
log(0.5)/ log(1 − FAR) · IDT ≈ 7 min. If all four processors are used in
parallel, the time furthermore reduces to ≈ 2 min.
Let us discuss another interesting point. In [23] it is reported that if the
(511, 19)-BCH code is used to protect the ordinate values of the construction
9We refer to Table 3 and 4 in [25] in where the sum rule is used for similarity measure-
ment between vault features and query features.
10 Actually, these are not statistically independent.
11The decoding times were reported for genuine authentication attempts only. For
simplicity, we assume that it agrees with impostor decoding time.
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of [20] the false acceptance rate drops from 0.7% to 0.01%. At a first glance,
this may lead to the conclusion that the security is improved by a factor
of ≈ 70. But this is not true: An adversary may decouple the basic vault
construction from the protected ordinate values due to a very low sphere
packing density. More precisely, the expected number of a protected vault
point’s ordinate value is estimated as S = 1+4.25 ·10−29 (see Section 3.2.2).
Assuming that each vault point’s correct ordinate value is contained in the
candidate set, we set S′ = S − 1 as the expected number of wrong ordinate
values. Using Markov’s inequality, the probability that there is at least
one wrong candidate is less than S′ = 4.25 · 10−29. Thus, the probability
that decoupling the protected ordinate values to yield an instance of the
basic vault without protected ordinate values is (1 − S′)n = (1 − S′)224 ≈
1− 9.52 · 10−27 which is overwhelming. Consequently, if the sphere packing
density of the underlying error-correcting code is too small, protecting the
ordinate values causes virtually no improvement against the false-accept
attack.
3.4 Intermediate Discussion
Our investigations clearly show that biometric cryptosystems that are based
on a single fingerprint cannot provide sufficient security — unless the false
acceptance is reduced to a cryptographic negligible level: It is very easy to
break a single fuzzy fingerprint vault using the false-accept attack. This
highly advocates that a secure fingerprint cryptosystem must be based on
multiple finger — or even finger in combination with other biometric modal-
ities.
There remain problems with the fuzzy fingerprint vault that can not be
solved merely by switching to multiple fingers and that have to be resolved
first. These are the problems of cross-matching and the correlation attack.
3.5 Cross-Matching and the Correlation Attack
One of the most serious risks the fuzzy fingerprint vault is concerned with
is its high vulnerability to cross-matching.
Cross-matching is always possible by, for instance, the brute-force attack:
One of the vaults is attacked to reveal its template; this template is then
used to open the other vault; if successful, both vaults are considered to
match. While such an approach is always possible, there exists a more
efficient method to separate genuine points from chaff points, if two vaults
protecting the same finger are given: By correlating the vaults, genuine
minutiae have a bias to be in agreement in both vaults while chaff minutiae
are likely to be separate. An example illustrating this approach is given by
Figure 3.
While correlation has the inadvertent effect that vault records can be
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: (a), (b) Two aligned vaults with chaff minutiae (gray and light-
gray) and genuine minutiae (red and blue). (c) The genuine minutiae have
a bias to be in agreement.
cross-matched, it is even possible for the attacker to efficiently break two
vault’s templates and keys given the vaults protect templates from the same
finger as it was first supposed by Scheirer and Boult in 2007 [31]. As a
consequence, separating genuine points from chaff points via correlation has
the potential to be much more efficient than merely attacking one of the
vaults via brute-force.
In 2008, Kholmatov and Yanikoglu [32] have demonstrated the effective-
ness of the correlation attack. Against the fuzzy vault construction of Uludag
et al. (2005) [18], they experimentally observed 59% successful recoveries
using the correlation attack against 200 matching vault correspondences.
Moreover, the authors were able to perform the correlation attack within
50 sec on average using a non-optimized Matlab implementation on a 3Ghz
CPU. In comparison to the brute-force attack, which is expected to last
≈ 80 hours on a single core of a 3.2Ghz desktop computer (see Table 2),
an intruder who has intercepted two matching vault records from different
applications may quickly recover the corresponding templates and keys —
even if he has no large database to perform a false-accept attack.
Cross-matching might already be enabled just by matching alignment
helper data (see [19, 20, 34]) even though this alone does not imply that
multiple records of the same template can be broken efficiently. While the
possibility of cross-matching using alignment data alone is already an se-
curity issue, it is especially an issue in combination with the correlation
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attack: An adversary may filter out genuine vault correspondences from dif-
ferent application’s databases with the help of the public alignment data;
afterwards, he can perform the correlation attack even faster because he can
quickly align the vaults using the alignment data. Moreover, merely using
alignment-free features as proposed by Li et al. (2010) [25] will not resolve
the risk of cross-matching or attacks via record multiplicity.
Nandakumar, Nagar, and Jain (2008) [21] proposed to incorporate an
additional user password into the vault. Furthermore, the additional security
provided by the user passwords may prevent the vaults from being cross-
matched and from being vulnerable to the correlation attack. However,
using a user password causes inconveniences that were actually meant to be
resolved by biometric based authentication schemes (e.g., weak or forgotten
passwords).
In the next section we show that it is possible to implement a usable
fingerprint fuzzy vault that is resistant against the correlation attack and
that gets along without an additional user password.
4 Implementation of a Cross-Matching Resistant
Minutiae Fuzzy Vault
We have shown that a single finger is not sufficient to provide a secure
biometric cryptosystem due to a cryptographically non-negligible false ac-
ceptance rate. Rather biometric cryptosystems that are based on multiple
finger/modalities should be developed and analyzed more extensively. First
steps have already been made (e.g., see [29,30]). However, it is obvious that
merely fusing multiple finger to be protected by the fuzzy vault scheme will
not resolve the problem of cross-matching or the correlation attack.
In this section, we propose an implementation of a minutiae fuzzy vault
that is inherently resistant against cross-matching and that gets along with-
out an additional password (see [21]). Roughly speaking, we achieve cross-
matching resistance using the simple idea of rounding minutiae to a rigid
hexagonal grid; the minutiae angles are quantized as well. Each element of
the rigid system to where a minutia is quantized encodes a genuine vault
point while the remaining elements encode chaff points. As a consequence
the feature set between different vault records are equal which makes cross-
matching via correlation useless to attack the vaults.
4.1 Vault Construction
Minutia Quantization
Given a minutiae template of a fingerprint, each of its minutia is quantized
first. Let m = (a, b, θ) be a minutia at pixel (a, b) and of angle θ ∈ [0, 360).
Let Ri be the point of a (hexagonal) grid {R0, . . . , Rr−1} laying within the
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Figure 4: The minutiae (a) positions are rounded to the location of the
points of a hexagonal grid (b). Each other point of the grid (c) is used to
encode a chaff point.
fingerprint image’s region that best approximates (a, b). Furthermore, let
j = bθ/360 · sc where s denotes the parameter controlling the number of
values into where angles are quantized. Now, the integer i + r · j encodes
the quantization of m. Let xi,j ∈ F denote the finite field element encoding
i+r ·j by some (but fixed) convention. Then the quantization of the minutia
m is given by the map quant(m) 7→ xi,j .
Note, that the feature set in where minutiae quantizations can occur is
E = { xi,j | i = 0, . . . , r − 1, j = 0, . . . , s− 1}.
Enrollment
Let tmax be a bound on the genuine point’s size and T be an input minutiae
template that we want to protect. Write T = {m1,m2, . . .} and assume
that if mi is of better quality than mj this implies i < j. The feature set
A is defined to contain at most tmax quantizations of the first best-quality
minutiae. Note, that A can contain fewer elements than T .12 Let t = |A|.
The next step is to bind the template quantized as A to a secret poly-
nomial f ∈ F[X] of degree < k. This is done as usual by letting the genuine
set G = { (x, f(x)) | x ∈ A }.
12If there are minutiae in T that have equal quantization then it is possible that |A| <
|T |.
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As in the usual vault, the genuine set is hidden among a large set of chaff
points. But now, every element in E that is not contained in A corresponds
to a chaff point. More precisely, C = { (x, y) | x ∈ E \A } where the ys are
chosen uniformly at random from F such that y 6= f(x).
The vault consists of the union of genuine and chaff points. Furthermore,
a cryptographic hash value of the secret polynomial is stored along with the
vault. Thus the public vault is the tuple (V, h(f)) where V = G ∪C.
Vault Authentication
On authentication, a query minutiae template is given for which we assume
that it is already aligned to the vault. Then the corresponding feature set
B is extracted from the query template in the same way as A was extracted
from the enrollment template. Using B the unlocking set is built out of those
points from V that have abscissa value in B, i.e. U = { (x, y) ∈ V | x ∈ B }.
Let ω = |A ∩ B|. Then U contains exactly ω genuine points. Thus, if
ω ≥ k the secret polynomial f can be obtained from U in the same way as
described in Section 2.2.
4.2 Training
Our construction is controlled by the following parameters:
• The minimal distance of the hexagonal grid points λ which (together
with the fingerprint image’s dimension) controls the number of hexag-
onal grid points r;
• the number of values s into where the minutia’s angle are quantized;
• the bound tmax on the number of genuine vault points;
• the size k of the secret polynomial.
We performed systematical tests to determine a good configuration of the
above parameters. Therefore we determined the GARs and the FARs on
the FVC 2002 DB2-B (which is intended for training purposes; see [35]) for
each configuration of
λ = 8, . . . , 32; s = 1, . . . , 8;
tmax = 10, . . . , 60; k = 1, . . . , tmax.
(6)
For the GARs, each finger’s ith impression was used to extract the feature
set A; each jth (where j > i) impression of the finger aligned to the ith
was used to extract its features B; if |A ∩ B| ≥ k this was accounted for
as a genuine accept; otherwise it was accounted for as a false reject. For
the FAR, each Ith finger’s first impression was used to extract the feature
set A; each Jth finger’s first impression (where J > I) was used to extract
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B; again, if |A ∩B| ≥ k this was counted as a false accept; otherwise as a
reject.
The best configuration13 was obtained as
λ = 29, s = 6, tmax = 44, and k = 7 (7)
with a GAR = 100% and FAR = 0%. The number of hexagonal grid points
of minimal distance λ = 29 that fit in an image of dimension 296 × 560
is r = 242. For the angles are quantized into s = 6 possible values, the
size of the vault is n = r · s = 1452. Thus, the brute-force security is
bf(1452, 44, 7) ≈ 236. If a higher security is sought, we may choose a higher
k.
4.3 Randomized Decoder
The potential recognition performance of our construction looks promis-
ing. However, there remains a problem concerning the decoding work. If a
brute-force security at least 240 is sought we may choose k = 8. On an au-
thentication attempt, an unlocking set of size up to tmax = 44 is built. If we
would attempt to decode by iterating through all candidate polynomials of
degree < k that interpolate k unlocking points, (448 ) ≈ 227 iterations have to
be performed in the worst case before the user is possibly accepted/rejected.
This is too expensive for a usable system.
As a countermeasure, we propose to randomize the decoding procedure
of Section 2.2. Instead of iterating through all polynomials of degree < k
that interpolate k unlocking points, we only iterate through at most D
polynomials each interpolating k randomly selected unlocking points.
On authentication, if the unlocking set U contains ω ≥ k genuine points
the randomized decoder will successfully output the correct polynomial with
probability at least 1 − (1 − bf(tmax, ω, k)−1)D which approaches 100% as
D → ∞. Moreover, if the unlocking set U contains ω < k genuine points
the randomized decoder will not succeed in decoding. Consequently, both
GAR and FAR for a fixed k drop if the randomized decoder is used.
Furthermore, the use of the randomized decoder only affects authentica-
tion and not the vault construction. Thus, for a fixed k, the overall security
does not suffer if the randomized decoder is used.
4.4 Performance Evaluation
For the configuration determined during the training and for different k,
we performed performance evaluations of our implementation following the
description of Section 2.4. We have chosen D = 216 iterations for the ran-
domized decoder which corresponds to a reasonable amount of iterations
13The best configuration was defined as to yield the highest GAR at the lowest FAR;
among these configurations, the one with maximal k/tmax has been selected.
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Table 5: Result of the Performance Evaluation
pol. genuine false avg. avg. brute-
degree acceptance acceptance genuine impostor force
rate rate decoding decoding security
time time
< k GAR (sub-GAR) FAR GDT IDT bf(1452, 44, k)
= 7 ≈ 91.96% (= 97%) ≈ 0.46% ≈ 0.03 sec ≈ 0.28 sec ≈ 236
= 8 ≈ 86.82% (= 95%) ≈ 0.081% ≈ 0.06 sec ≈ 0.35 sec ≈ 243
= 9 ≈ 80.36% (= 93%) ≈ 0.02% ≈ 0.1 sec ≈ 0.41 sec ≈ 247
= 10 ≈ 72.61% (= 91%) = 0% ≈ 0.17 sec ≈ 0.51 sec ≈ 252
= 11 ≈ 63.11% (= 86%) = 0% ≈ 0.26 sec ≈ 0.60 sec ≈ 257
= 12 ≈ 53.57% (= 80%) = 0% ≈ 0.39 sec ≈ 0.73 sec ≈ 263
that is feasible on current hardware. In addition to genuine acceptance
rates and false acceptance rates, the average genuine decoding times as well
as the average impostor decoding times were determined. The results can
be found in Table 5.
In order to compare our results with other fuzzy vault implementations,
we also kept track of the genuine acceptance rate in which only the first two
impressions are taken into account (the first impression is used for enroll-
ment and the second as the query). The corresponding rates are denoted
as sub-GAR in Table 5. We reached sub-GAR = 91% in the case no false
accepts have been observed. In comparison, on the same dataset Nagar et
al. (2010) [23] achieve sub-GAR = 93% at zero false accepts while Li et
al. (2010) [25] achieve sub-GAR = 92%. Even though our results are only
valid under a well-solved alignment framework our implementation provides
resistance against the correlation attack — even without a user password
(see [21]).
4.5 Alternative Fuzzy Extractor Construction
Another advantage of our implementation is that it can be easily modified
to meet the requirements for the modified fuzzy vault construction proposed
by Dodis et al. (2008) [14]. This construction avoids the generation of chaff
points and significantly reduces the amount of memory that is required for
storage. The changes that have to be made would not affect the construc-
tion’s performance or security against the brute-force or false-accept attack.
For details of the construction we refer to [14].
However, without preventions, multiple records of the fuzzy extractor
construction may become vulnerable to cross-matching, especially, if the
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protected templates are equal. The way of cross-matching is similar to the
decodability attack as it has been investigated by Kelkboom et al. (2011) [43].
Fortunately, applying a random bit-permutation process secures the fuzzy
extractor construction from cross-matching based on the decodability attack.
For details we refer to [43].
4.6 Security Analysis
Our implementation provides good security against the brute-force attack.
For example, if k = 10 at a 52-bit brute-force security level we have em-
pirically determined that an adversary can test 128, 205 polynomials per
second on a single core of a 3.2Ghz desktop computer with four processor
cores. Thus, if all four cores are used in parallel, he can expect to break an
instance of our implementation after approximately 192 years.
Our implementation obviously is resistant against the correlation attack
and cross-matching via correlation. But the implementation’s vulnerability
against the false-accept attack remains to be evaluated.
It is possible to analyze the false-accept attack analogous to Section 3.3
using confidence intervals. But there is a more elegant way to estimate the
false-acceptance rate.
Assume that within an impostor authentication attempt an unlocking
set of size t is built containing ω genuine vault points. Using D decoding
iterations the vault can be unlocked with probability
p(t, ω,D) =
{
1− (1− bf(t, ω, k)−1)D, if ω ≥ k
0, if ω < k.
Thus, if in a test with N impostor authentication attempt the ith unlocking
set is of size ti containing ωi genuine vault points then we may estimate the
false acceptance rate as FAR ≈ 1N
∑N
i=1 p(ti, ωi,D). Note, that the effort
in authenticating increases linearly with the number of decoding iterations
D. Therefore, we estimate the cost for a successful false-accept attack as
log(0.5)/ log(1− FAR) · D.
As the attacker is free in choosing whichever decoder he prefers, he may
choose the number of decoding iterations that minimizes the cost.
Lemma 1. The cost for a successful false-accept attack is minimized for
D = 1.
Proof. Let (x) be the false-acceptance rate as a function in the number
of decoding iterations x. Then g(x) = log(0.5)/ log(1 − (x)) · x is the
cost function of a successful false-accept attack. Note that we can write
1 − (x) = 1N
∑
αxi where 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1. Using Jensen’s inequality we can
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bound 1− (x) ≥ ( 1N ∑αi)x. Thus,
g(x) =
| log(0.5)|
| log(1− (x))| · x ≥
| log(0.5)|∣∣log (( 1N ∑αi)x)∣∣ · x
=
| log(0.5)|∣∣log ( 1N ∑αi)∣∣ · x · x = | log(0.5)|∣∣log ( 1N ∑αi)∣∣ = g(1)
which proves the lemma.
The lemma enables us to estimate a lower bound for the cost of the
false-accept attack against our implementation assuming the adversary also
utilizes the randomized decoder. However, the attacker may prefer to use
more than only one decoding iteration, e.g., if he uses a fingerprint database
for the attack of medium size. Furthermore, the time needed to build the
unlocking sets was not taken into account, but it increases the cost for a
false-accept attack in practice. But for a security analysis, it is safer to rely
on a lower bound.
Hence, in a test of N impostor authentication attempts in where the
ith unlocking set was of size ti containing ωi genuine points, the cost for
a successful false-accept attack can be estimated as log(0.5)/ log(1 − FAR)
where FAR = 1N
∑
p(ti, ωi) with
p(ti, ωi) = p(ti, ωi, 1) =
{
bf(ti, ωi, k)
−1 if ωi ≥ k
0 if ωi < k.
Table 6: Performance of the false-accept attack on a four-core desktop com-
puter with 3.2Ghz.
polynomial degree false acceptance rate expected time for a
< k FAR false-accept attack
= 7 ≈ 8.31 · 10−8 ≈ 36 sec
= 8 ≈ 8.87 · 10−9 ≈ 2 min
= 9 ≈ 8.53 · 10−10 ≈ 21 min
= 10 ≈ 6.95 · 10−11 ≈ 5 hours
= 11 ≈ 4.40 · 10−12 ≈ 4 days
= 12 ≈ 1.86 · 10−13 ≈ 120 days
To estimate the false acceptance rate of our implementation for different
k, we simulated impostor authentication attempts on the FVC 2002 DB2-A
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database following the FVC protocol which yielded N = 4, 950 impostor
authentication attempts. For the simulations, we used the same configura-
tions as in the performance evaluation. For the ith impostor authentication
attempt, we quantized the first finger as the set A and the second as B.
Then we let ti = |B| and counted ωi = |A∩B|. Using p(ti, ωi) we estimated
the false acceptance rate FAR for a single decoding iteration and the corre-
sponding cost for the false-accept attack. Consulting the impostor decoding
times determined during the evaluation we know how much 216 iterations
of the false-accept attack cost. We used this information to determine the
time for a successful false-accept attack on a 3.2Ghz desktop computer. The
results can be found in Table 6.
Example 6. For example, if k = 9 the false acceptance rate was found to
be FAR ≈ 8.53 ·10−10 for a single decoding iteration. Thus, the attacker can
expect to use approximately log(0.5)/ log(1 − 8.53 · 10−10) ≈ 8.13 · 108 fin-
ger as queries to successfully break the vault. As the time for 216 iterations
was found to be IDT ≈ 0.41 sec the time for a successful false-accept attack
can be estimated as 8.13 · 108/216 · 0.41 sec ≈ 1–2 hours. If all four proces-
sor cores were used in parallel, the time furthermore reduces to ≈ 21 min
which is much more efficient than the brute-force attack requiring 192 years.
Please note, like other implementations our construction is also vulnerable
to intensive false-accept attacks.
5 Discussion and Outlook
We investigated the security of current implementations of the fuzzy fin-
gerprint vault. We found that, even if the brute-force attack is impractical
against some implementations, this does not hold for the false-accept at-
tack. This attack is feasible for every authentication scheme in which the
false acceptance rate is non-negligible and thus it is for current implemen-
tations of biometric cryptosystem protecting a single fingerprint’s template.
Even worse, according to our observations, the false-accept attack can be
performed much more efficiently than the brute-force attack. One may ar-
gue, that it is infeasible for an adversary to establish databases which are
of sufficient size to perform intensive false-accept attacks off-line. First, in
our view, this can not be prevented having in mind that there exist large
databases containing real fingers. Second, the performances of false-accept
attacks are hints for the existence of similar efficient statistical attacks. Such
attacks may be prevented using multiple fingers or even multiple biometric
modalities. Therefore, multi-finger fuzzy vaults should be investigated as a
potential method wherever high security is important. And yet a significant
risk remains: The correlation attack cannot be prevented merely by using
multiple fingers.
Therefore we endeavored to solve the problem of the correlation attack.
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In this paper we have demonstrated that it is possible to implement a minu-
tiae fuzzy vault that is resistant against the correlation attack without loss
of authentication performance. Our implementation primarily relies on the
simple innovation of rounding minutiae to a rigid grid while using the en-
tire grid as vault features, thereby preventing attackers from distinguishing
genuine from chaff features via correlation. Furthermore, to make vault
authentication practical, we proposed to use a randomized decoder rather
than systematically iterating through all candidate polynomials. Since the
randomized decoder only affects vault authentication and not vault construc-
tion, the randomized decoder does not adversely affect vault security. Well
conceived, the randomized decoder may be incorporated into a wide variety
of fuzzy vault implementations, not only fuzzy vaults with the express pur-
pose of protecting minutiae templates of a single finger. Furthermore, our
single-finger fuzzy vault construction that is resistant against the correlation
attack may be generalized to a construction that protects multiple fingers.
All experiments described in this paper can fully be reproduced using
software available for download.14
We did not propose a mechanism for dealing with alignment for our
vault construction. Although it would have been possible to adopt the ideas
available in the literature that propose to store additional alignment-helper
data publicly with the vault [17, 19, 20, 33, 34] it is not yet clear how this
would affect vault security. Moreover, some of the proposals find accurate
alignment via multiple candidate alignments: During authentication, for
each candidate alignment an authorization attempt is performed until the
correct secret is seen. Translating this method to multiple fingers is prob-
lematic because the number of candidate alignments grows exponentially
with the number of fingers. Consequently, fingerprint alignment techniques
for multi-finger fuzzy vaults should be reconsidered.
Ideally, fingerprints could be pre-aligned. This would make iterations
through several candidate alignments obsolete. Moreover, fuzzy vaults pro-
tecting accurately pre-aligned fingers do not need to store additional alignment-
helper data which can cause unwanted information leakage regarding the
corresponding finger. Prealignment of fingerprints is strongly related to
the concept of intrinsic coordinate systems [44, 45]. Unfortunately, current
methods that extract intrinsic coordinate systems are not robust enough to
produce fingerprint pre-alignment of sufficient accuracy. Although challeng-
ing, it may be worthwhile to seek more robust methods to extract intrinsic
14This comprises performance analyses of the brute-force attack, performance evalua-
tions of the minutiae fuzzy vault implementation as in Section 2, the training for deter-
mining a good configuration of our cross-matching resistant minutiae fuzzy vault imple-
mentation, its performance evaluations, and a program to analyze our implementation’s
resistance against the false-accept attack; these are sample programs for a C++ software
library that we call thimble; visit http://www.stochastik.math.uni-goettingen.de/
biometrics for downloading its source code.
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coordinate systems.
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